I. INTRODUCTION
Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes are instruments of increasing interest to policy makers to address deforestation in developing countries. The novelty of PES schemes is that, unlike other environmental instruments, they offer payments conditional on a desired outcome, for instance, forest conservation (Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Karsenty and Ezzine de Blas 2014; Wunder 2015) . These instruments are widely considered to be direct approaches to environmental protection that have the potential to mobilize resources for forest conservation. In recent years, they have become very popular among decision-makers and are now favored instruments for the redistribution of funds destined to protect forests (UNEP, Forest Trends, and The Katoomba Group 2008; Muradian et al. 2013) . However, as highlighted by Persson and Alpízar (2013) , the conditionality of PES schemes does not guarantee that they generate additionality if the beneficiaries would have Despite Ferraro and Pattanayak's (2006) seminal "Money for Nothing" paper, the lack of studies on PES impact evaluation has been well documented in the literature (Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010; Miteva, Pattanayak, and Ferraro 2012; Ferraro and Hanauer 2014; Baylis et al. 2015) . Several recent empirical works have begun to take up the challenge (e.g., Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims 2012; Arriagada et al. 2012; Robalino and Pfaff 2013; Costedoat et al. 2015 ). Yet, while a few careful impact evaluations now exist, a new challenge has arisen: treated parcels to be analyzed are no longer the first cohort of beneficiaries, and some beneficiaries have potentially exited the program during the study period. While this poses new methodological challenges (Le Velly and Dutilly 2016) , it also allows us to gain insight on the permanence of such programs; that is, whether the program's impact persists after beneficiaries withdraw.
We attempt to contribute to the literature by examining the impact of a PES program on several cohorts. We focus on a federal Mexican hydrological PES (the PSA-H) in the Yucatan state over the 2005-2012 period. We compare the impact of the program on each cohort of beneficiary parcels and thus provide insight on the permanence of the impact. Such investigation cannot be led without providing an overall evaluation of the program's effectiveness, that is, its additionality (avoided deforestation on protected parcels) minus potential leakages (impact of the program on deforestation on neighboring lands). Consequently, we implement an empirical strategy to estimate the three kinds of impact of a program on deforestation: additionality, leakages, and permanence.
We conduct the empirical analysis, based on remote sensing analysis using 2.5 to 20 m resolution SPOT satellite images and community surveys carried out in 76 communities, called ejidos in Mexico, located in the Cono Sur of Yucatan. This allows us to tackle several challenges. First, the unit of analysis differs from previous studies: we combine land tenure, land use, and gridding to obtain a homogeneous unit of analysis and create variables to measure deforestation determinants. This allows us to deal with selection on observable characteristics (compared to studies at the municipality level or even at the parcel level), while carefully taking property rights and decision-making into account. Second, we introduce spatially lagged exogenous variables to measure two kinds of leakages (activity-shifting and market effects). Finally, we take into account entry/exit phenomena over the studied period. We believe discussions on these choices may prove useful for other studies on the topic, while our empirical results are important from a policy design perspective.
II. EVALUATING PES IMPACT
In recent years, a growing body of empirical evidence examining PES impacts has emerged (e.g., Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims 2012; Arriagada et al. 2012; Robalino and Pfaff 2013) . This literature relies on existing impact evaluation methodologies developed in other fields of economics such as microfinance, health economics, and education (Ravallion 2007) . Evaluating PES impact requires reconstituting a counterfactual in order to evaluate the additionality of the program, that is, the avoided deforestation on protected parcels, as well as taking into account leakages that may undermine the additionality of the program. In this section, we briefly review the literature on PES additionality and leakages and explain how our study relates to it.
Estimating Avoided Deforestation
Evaluating additionality involves estimating the difference in outcome for a given parcel with and without the program, which therefore requires defining a proper counterfactual (Ferraro 2009) . Simple "before and after" or "with and without" comparisons are likely to be biased (Joppa and Pfaff 2009, 2010) . In econometric terms, there are confounding factors that affect both the PES reception and deforestation itself. In the context of PES, typical confounding factors are geographic variables including the percentage of forest cover, as well as important determinants of deforestation such as population density, slope, and elevation and distances to roads, cities, and agricultural fields (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999; Pfaff et al. 2009; HoneyRosés, Baylis, and Ramirez 2011) .
To minimize potential biases, researchers usually choose a control group located in the same agroecological area as the beneficiaries (e.g., Arriagada et al. 2012) . Additional unobservable confounding factors are household characteristics that affect deforestation rates, such as willingness to enter a PES scheme. To control for this issue, Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims (2012) use a control group consisting of applicants rejected for budget insufficiency. In our own study, we both limit the analysis to the South of the Yucatan State (homogeneity in agroecological characteristics) and drop nonapplicants from our sample in order to control for the willingness to join the PES scheme (unobserved heterogeneity).
To control for observed heterogeneity among treated and control groups, most empirical analysis relies on matching methods such as propensity score matching (Robalino and Pfaff 2013) or covariate matching (Arriagada et al. 2012) . A notable exception is the study by Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims (2012) in Mexico that uses matching as a preprocess in order to select a relevant control group and estimates the program's impact in a regression framework. We explain later why we adopt this latter strategy (Section V). 1 PES impact studies also differ according to the choice of the unit of observation. Some authors look at deforestation of pixels ), while others compute deforestation per forest owner (Arriagada et al. 2012) . Honey-Rosés, Baylis, and Ramirez (2011) propose building polygons by overlapping pixels of land cover, land tenure, and protection by natural protected areas. In this paper, we combine Honey-Rosés, Baylis, and Ramirez's approach with gridding. This allows us to improve selection on observables, while keeping the entire sample in the analysis, as explained in Section V.
Note that most studies conclude that the impact of PES on deforestation is low. They attribute this finding to weak capacity of schemes to focus on threatened forest (see Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro [2010] for a good literature review).
Estimating Leakage Effects
For carbon sequestration projects, leakage is defined by the International Panel on Climate Change as, "The indirect impact that a targeted land use, land use change and forestry activity in a certain place at a certain time has on carbon storage at another place or time" (Watson et al. 2000, section 2.3.5.2) . This definition, while simple, can encompass a wide variety of mechanisms. An important distinction is made between activity-shifting and market effects 2 (e.g., Wu 2000; Schwarze, Niles, and Olander 2002) .
As explained by Schwarze, Niles, and Olander (2002, 1687) , activity-shifting is the displacement of an activity outside of the project's boundaries. Let us consider the example of a landowner clearing forest to extract timber or to cultivate a commodity. He may shift his activities to another area, following the implementation of the PES scheme. 3 In forest Costa Rica, and Canavire-Bacarreza and Hanauer (2013) who used genetic matching in Bolivia.
2 This distinction is often made in the academic literature, sometimes under different terminology (e.g., primary, direct, or substitution effects versus secondary, indirect, or output price effects).
3 In most cases, the beneficiary of the project is the agent shifting activities, but leakages can also result from the behavior of another agent. conservation PES programs, if land is easily available, this type of leakage is very likely to undermine the project's additionality. Leakages may even exceed the positive effect of the project if the project relaxes a credit constraint (Jayachandran 2013) . A solution to enhance permanence and reduce leakage is to provide alternative livelihood options, as highlighted by Aukland, Moura Costa, and Brown (2003) . This requires combining PES with investment in alternative activities in order to relax dependence on the forest cover (Pirard, Billé, and Sembrés 2010; Karsenty 2011) . However, this solution could prove costly, and most PES schemes do not include such a feature.
Market effects occur if an environmental project such as a PES scheme affects the price of agricultural commodities or timber. If conservation decreases the supply of these commodities, their price may increase, which generates an incentive for additional deforestation. This leakage effect through prices is the most frequently cited in the literature (Wu 2000; Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock 2001) , but conservation programs can have other indirect effects. For instance, let us consider a project proposing alternative livelihoods options, as in the Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: if these options are very attractive, the project may generate an influx of population and increase deforestation (Aukland, Moura Costa, and Brown 2003) . In our case, we expect that an indirect effect might arise through agricultural markets. As a matter of fact, following conservation in one parcel, neighbors may face a higher demand for their agricultural products, which may increase deforestation in the neighboring area.
Leakages are important determinants of PES effectiveness (Wunder 2008; Delacote, Robinson, and Roussel 2016) . Two approaches are used in the literature to evaluate the extent of leakages. The first approach estimates a baseline of deforestation based on a theoretical model (Geres and Michaelowa 2002; Chomitz 2002; Murray, McCarl, and Lee 2004; Sohngen and Brown 2004) . The second approach uses econometrics and impact analysis tools. Our methodology derives from this second approach. In the context of Brazilian protected areas, Amin et al. (2014) use instrumental variables and spatially interrelated cross-sectional equations to account for the fact that protected areas are not randomly created. The authors provide evidence that the decisions of municipalities neighboring protected areas to deforest are complements and that protected areas generate leakages (in the sense that they shift deforestation activities to neighboring municipalities). To evaluate leakage effects, Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims (2012, 628) "compare deforestation rates for treated and control groups on other property that is owned by the same landholder or close to the program parcel but is not enrolled (or submitted to be enrolled)." Honey-Rosés, Baylis, and Ramirez (2011) compare the coefficients' magnitude of the impact of the PES with and without bordering parcels included in the control group. They infer the leakage effects in the border area from this difference. We here propose evaluating leakages using spatially lagged exogenous variables and simultaneously estimate avoided deforestation and leakages in a regression framework.
III. CONTEXT
The PSA-H The PSA-H is a federal Mexican PES program that has offered payments for forest conservation since 2003 (Munõz-Pinã et al. 2008) . It is a hydrological PES scheme that focuses on overexploited aquifers and is partially funded by a water tax. The scheme is managed by a federal forest commission called CONAFOR. Contrary to Mexico's other federal PES scheme, the PSA-CABSA, the PSA-H does not remunerate reforestation or agroforestry (Corbera, Soberanis, and Brown 2009) .
Around 80% of Mexican forests are owned by small communities (ejidos), and most of the forest cover is managed as commons (Bray et al. 2003) . This land tenure system results from agrarian reforms implemented over the twentieth century in Mexico and makes Mexican PES programs unique. Indeed, PES contracts are signed with ejidos, not with individuals. Within the ejidos, each ejidatario (individual communal land holder) has an equal vote at the assembly, where decisions related to the commons such as land clearing are discussed and voted on. Enrolling land into a PSA-H requires an agreement at the assembly. The ejidos do not necessarily enroll all of their forest into the PSA-H. Once enrolled, the ejido receives payments proportional to the number of hectares enrolled. Contracts last for five years and guarantee yearly payments. After five years, the ejido can apply again to renew the contract on the same parcel and can also accumulate contracts over time in different areas of the ejido. Payments received can be invested in public goods or redistributed among ejidatarios (García-Amado et al. 2011 ).
The Cono Sur
Ejido surveys were conducted in the 76 ejidos of the Cono Sur, a region covering the southern part of the Mexican Yucatan state (Figure 1 ). The 76 surveyed ejidos constitute an exhaustive sample of all ejidos in the region that were eligible for PSA-H reception in 2012. In this sample, more than 60% of the households are involved in agricultural activities or cattle ranching. The main crop cultivated is maize intercropped with beans, mostly for self-consumption (only around 15% of households sell a share of the harvest). Many households combine these activities with off-farm work. Most communities are quite far from the main markets (on average 35 km, or more than 50 min). Among these (2012), we kept only the 22 nonbeneficiary ejidos that had already applied to the program to control for the willingness to join the program. Among those 22 ejidos, 16 entered the program in the next two years. On average, rejected applicants were accepted into the program two years after their first application. Our final sample is composed of 62 ejidos. Figure 2 displays the initial enrollment date into the PSA-H. Figure 3 presents the evolution of eligibility zones in the Cono Sur between 2004 and 2012. Eligibility zones have been enlarged over time. Eligibility of an area is decided at the federal level by CONAFOR, but regional offices can suggest including new areas. According to CONAFOR's regional staff, the northern area became eligible later than the southern area because information concerning the forest cover loss in the north was not available and funds were insufficient at the federal level to cover all of the Cono Sur.
IV. THE DATA
Our study combines information from three main sources: SPOT images, 4 ejido surveys, and data from several Mexican institutes.
The data on deforestation were obtained by comparing maps generated with a geographic information system (GIS; Idrisi 17.0 [Eastman 2012] ) for the years 2005 and 2012. Maps were produced from SPOT satellite images. Thanks to their higher spatial resolution, with pixel sizes representing 10 or 20m over the ground in color scenes and 2.5m in black and white scenes, SPOT images were more accurate than LANDSAT images, the other group of images widely available, in recognizing land cover and land uses in this detailed study. Pixel size in LANDSAT images is 30 m, and black-and-white scenes are not available for every year. Color multispectral SPOT images (10 and 20 m pixel resolution) were used in a nonsupervised classification procedure. Approximately 30 spectral classes were obtained for each scene and were labeled using information gathered on more than 150 field sites where vegetation and land use were checked and geographical coordinates were recorded using GPS. The defined classification allowed us to distinguish between forests, agricultural fields (including pasture), roads, and infrastructure, which allowed us to introduce several fine-grained control variables. The initial maps were refined by visual interpretation of SPOT black-and-white panchromatic images with 2.5 m pixel resolution. Thanks to this and to the use of ancillary images from years 2006, 2008, and 2009 , it was possible to separate with more precision those fields of less than 4 ha cultivated for one or two years under a shifting cultivation system. At this point, information generated from interviews with ejido authorities was drawn on map sketches, which was very helpful in confirming new clearings.
All the ejidos in this sample were surveyed in December 2012. These surveys were implemented by a project called PESMIX, financed by the French National Research Agency and coordinated by the International Research Center for Agronomy and Development. These surveys included participatory mapping that helped to identify the different land uses for the remote sensing analysis. During these surveys, many issues were explored, including distribution of the payments, governance, and economic activities. The data obtained from the survey regarding PSA-H enrollment and payments received are in accordance with CONAFOR data.
Information on program coverage (in time and space) was obtained from CONAFOR (Federal Forest Commission) . Additional information regarding ejido characteristics was obtained from INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography), INECC (National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change), and CONAPO (National Population Commission). The sources of each variable used in the empirical investigation can be found in Appendix Table A1 .
V. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The aim of this section is to propose a rigorous empirical strategy for the evaluation of the PSA-H in Yucatan. First, we build polygons by combining gridding, land use, land tenure, and PES reception. Second, we use a regression framework and also use prematching to account for the selection bias. Third, we explicitly introduce leakages in our estimation using spatial econometrics. Fourth, we introduce the time spent in the program and heterogeneity in the enrollment date, which allows us insights on the permanence of the program's impact.
Combining Gridding, Land Tenure, and PES Reception
To analyze deforestation in the Cono Sur region, we relied on 2.5, 10, and 20 m resolution SPOT images for 2005 and 2012. The remote sensing analysis was based on groundtruthing data and participatory mapping. The defined classification allows us to distinguish among forests, agricultural fields (including pasture), roads, and infrastructure. The relevant zones to be analyzed and included in the empirical analysis are the forested areas in 2005 (e.g., Figure 4a 5 ). Other land use classes are used to build control variables, as explained in this section.
The remote sensing analysis provides us with information at the pixel level. Nevertheless, in the current investigation, a grid-level analysis is preferable to a pixel-level analysis. A grid-level analysis decreases measurement errors and allows us to keep the entire sample in the empirical analysis. 6 A grid is a pattern of horizontal and vertical lines that forms cells of homogeneous area. We use a grid of 500 5 Forest cover is in gray; absence of color corresponds to all other land uses. Grid's length is 500 m. Ejidos' borders are marked by a thick gray line; PSA-H areas (2010 cohort) are hatched. All maps are oriented north. 6 An alternative approach would have been to randomly select pixels in our 20 million pixel-level observations sample. Yet a risk of nonrepresentative selection would have remained and would have complicated the analysis of leakages. m, which provides us with 25 ha cells, or approximately the average size of a crop field in the studied area. We apply gridding on the satellite images, as shown in Figure 4b . At this point, each grid contains more than 600 pixels. If a cell is not entirely covered by forest, we redefine its boundary and keep only the forested part for our analysis. Furthermore, explaining the deforestation level of a cell spreading over two ejidos would not be relevant since the decision to deforest does not belong to the same group of individuals for each part of the cell. Consequently, we merge the gridding with ejido borders (Figure 4c ). Two separate observations are created for each transboundary cell.
The next step is to integrate the protection status of each parcel. We merge our GIS database with borders of the PSA-H contracts as defined by CONAFOR. As described in the previous section, an ejido can enroll the same parcel in the program several times. For instance, a parcel covered by the program during the 2004-2009 period may be renewed during the 2009-2013 period or not. By merging PES borders with our GIS database, we are able to determine the period of time that a parcel was treated. Obviously, if only half of a grid is covered by the program (Figure  4d ), the observation is, once again, split in two. 7 The final polygons are slightly heterogeneous in size but homogeneous in terms of program status (i.e., protected or not), number of years of reception, and land tenure (belonging to the same ejido).
Eventually, by overlapping the forest polygons of 2005 and 2012, we compute the percentage of forest loss within each polygon during the initial years of the PSA-H implementation. For each polygon of forest, we also use information on other land cover classes such as distances to the village, roads and agricultural fields, elevation, slope, and spatially lagged variables to compute geographic variables. We complete these data with information at the ejido level from the ejido survey conducted in December 2012. This allows us to improve our identification strategy, partly based on selection on observables, as explained in the next section.
We drop polygons of less than 0.5 ha since they mainly result from misoverlap of the original PSA-H polygons. These observations represent less than 1% of our study area. Our final sample is composed of 10,352 forested polygons. There are, on average, 170 polygons per ejido. In our study area, forest covered more than 174,000 ha in 2005. Around 77,000 ha were enrolled in the PSA-H at various points in time between 2005 and 2013. During this period, 7,900 ha of forest were lost, which corresponds to more than 4.7% of the total forest cover in 2005.
7 By extension, when several PES contracts overlap (e.g., a parcel is protected by a 2005-2009 contract and a 2010-2014 contract), observation boundaries are redefined. All the area of forest within each polygon is protected during the exact same period.
Identifying the Impact of the Program
To identify the impact of the program, we focus on a homogeneous agroecological region, the Cono Sur. In addition, we exclude non-program applicants from the studied sample in order to control for the willingness to join the PES scheme. Finally, we implement a prematching procedure and study the impact of the program through a regression framework, as described in the following sections.
Prematching: Dealing with Selection
About 43% of the polygons in our sample received the PSA-H payments before dropping the nonapplicant ejidos. Once the nonapplicants are dropped, our sample is composed of 10,352 polygons including 48% of treated polygons. As there are confounding factors impacting both deforestation and reception of the program, we must account for the selection process in order to correct the bias. We estimate the probability that a parcel is enrolled into the PSA-H (propensity score) and use the predicted probability in two ways. First, we use a matching procedure based on propensity scores to select our sample. Second, we introduce the propensity score as a control variable in our regressions. This strategy is similar to that of Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims (2012) and Alix-Garcia et al. (2015) .
A regression framework is preferred to a matching estimator for two reasons: it allows us to directly estimate leakage effects through spatially lagged variables and, contrary to usual impact evaluation techniques, to use a continuous treatment in order to take into consideration the time spent in the program.
We estimate the following model for propensity scores:
[1]
The probability that a polygon enrolled into the PSA-H between 2005 and 2012 (psa ij = 1), depends on the decision of ejido j to join the PSA-H and the choice of the ejido to enroll polygon i rather than another polygon. For this reason we include variables at the ejido X j and polygon level Z ij . At the ejido level, the set of K control variables X includes the size of the ejido in thousands of hectares and the number of ejidatarios per hectare (the variables Size of the ejido and Population density). We also control for two major PSA-H selection criteria likely to influence deforestation: the marginality index computed by CONAPO in 2005 (Marginality index), and the deforestation risk index (Deforestation risk) (Munõz-Pinã et al. 2008) . 8 The set of L control variables Z at the polygon level includes the size of the polygon in 2005 (the variable Polygon size), the average slope (Average slope), and distances to the nearest road and agricultural field or pasture within the ejidos in 2005, 9 as well as the distance in kilometers to the nearest city of more than 2,500 inhabitants (the variables Distance to road, Distance to agri, and, Distance to city). We control for the number of years of eligibility (Nb of years since eligible) and the conditional probability that the polygon enrolled into the PSA-H (pscore), as explained earlier in this section. Variable definitions and sources, as well as basic descriptive statistics, can be found in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 .
Based on the distribution of the propensity scores for treated and control groups, we restrict our sample to the common support. Moreover, for each treated observation, we keep in our sample the first nearest neighbor in terms of propensity score with replacement. Through this process, we ensure that our control group is similar to our treated group. In order to take heterogeneity of propensity scores into account, we introduce the propensity score as a control variable in our estimation.
One may wonder if the prematching procedure could be biased because of the small number of beneficiary ejidos (12 out of 62). However, as explained above, we restrict our 8 The marginality index is based on measures of education, infrastructure, or access to energy, among others, while the deforestation risk index is an indicator generated by the Instituto Nacional de Ecologia using regression analysis of deforestation patterns in the period 1994-2000. 9 If we had not considered land tenure in the definition of the unit of analysis, it would have been impossible to compute these important confounding factors.
sample to applicants and expect all ejidos in our sample to be enrolled in the program sooner or later. Therefore, the selection bias in our case is at the parcel level more than at the ejido level. Our polygons have been built in order to represent parcels of land of approximately 25 ha, which is a relevant size for decision-making by the ejidatarios. Therefore, we consider that our sample is composed of 10,352 observations including 5,389 nontreated polygons. Another concern involves the stable unit treatment value assumption. It is true that polygons from the same ejidos are not independent. However, it should be noted that the matching is used only in order to select a relevant counterfactual based on pretreatment characteristics. The impact of the program is computed in a second step, and leakages are controlled for in the estimation using a spatially lagged exogeneous variable (below).
Estimating Additionality
After this final sample selection, we are ready to estimate the impact of the program. We estimate, via ordinary least squares (OLS), the following model:
[2]
The 
Introducing Leakages
Two kinds of leakages can exist in our studied zone: activity-shifting and market effects. The former occurs because deforestation activities are displaced from protected to unprotected parcels inside the ejido, or because the PES releases the ejidatario's budget constraints, which leads the ejidatario to clear new parcels. We assume that these leakages depend on the share of forest within the ejido covered by the program. Thus, we introduce the following variable to control for leakages through activity-shifting:
11 Technically, we adopt regression adjustment for the propensity scores with confounders included along the propensity score in the outcome model. In reality, we had three options to control for confounding factors: introducing only propensity scores in the regression, introducing covariates only, or both. Introducing only covariates or introducing covariates and propensity scores leads to almost identical results. The results we show are slightly more conservative (and lead us to find less additionality and less leakage) than those found when only propensity scores are introduced. In theory, the optimal method depends on the distribution of covariates among treated and untreated observations, and whether the propensity score model is correctly specified or not. See Vansteelandt and Daniel (2014) for an interesting comparison of all three choices.
12 Standard errors are clustered in all regressions except the ones using propensity score weighting, displayed in Table 5 (robustness test). As a matter of fact, the proper way to cluster standard errors with this type of estimator has not been developed yet.
where ω ir is equal to 1 if polygon r is located in the same ejido as i, and is the for-05 forest rj ested area in hectares in 2005 of polygon r located in ejido j.
The PSA-H may also lead to leakages outside of the ejido because the ejidatarios want to buy more agricultural commodities from their neighbors, increasing deforestation pressure in surrounding ejidos. Market effects are captured by introducing a second spatially lagged exogenous variable to the estimated equation, such as
The new weighting factor υ jm is equal to 1 if ejido m is within a 20 km buffer of ejido j's border.
The estimated equation is now
Once controlled for psa ij , β 3 and β 4 capture the leakages effects, that is, the impact of the program on deforestation in neighboring lands. We implicitly assume that the stronger the constraint induced by the PES on the forest cover, and the larger the money flows brought by the program, the larger the leakage effects on unprotected lands will be. Note that Yucatan is well connected to the rest of the country, and the agricultural production of our study area is relatively small compared to Mexican production overall. Thus, it is unlikely that the program will affect agricultural prices and generate market effects.
Introducing Time Spent in the Program
The final step of our empirical strategy is to account for heterogeneity in the treatment exposure, as recommended by Miteva, Pattanayak, and Ferraro (2012) . Some parcels are protected over the whole period, some only at the beginning of the period, and some at the end. Two strategies are implemented: first we control for the time enrolled in the program, 
Exposure Heterogeneity
We study the impact of the PES over eight years, between 2005 and 2012. PES contracts last five years, and the time spent in the program by each observation is heterogeneous, as shown in Figure 5 . For this reason, in equation [4], we replace psa ij by tpsa ij : the number of years a parcel has been covered by the program. Note that tpsa ij also replaces psa ij in the calculation of the leakages variables.
[4]
In equation [4] , coefficient β 1 gives the impact on deforestation of one year spent in the program in polygon i. Coefficients β 3 and β 4 capture the leakage effects, but the interpretation is more subtle than in equation [3] . In fact, β 3 and β 4 capture the impact on deforestation in polygon i of the average time spent in the PSA-H by 1 ha of forest located in ejido j (wtpsa 1 ij ) and in surrounding ejidos located in the buffer zone (wtpsa 2 ij ).
Enrollment Date
Our sample is not homogeneous regarding the time of program entry. On the contrary, it is composed of early beneficiaries that left the program after five years, late beneficiaries that participated in the program only at the end of our period of analysis, and beneficiaries that were enrolled in the program at the beginning and who subsequently renewed. The latter were in the program for almost eight years.
In order to disentangle the impact for these different cohorts, we split the variable tpsa ij into three variables: tpsaearl ij corresponds to the time spent by polygons that were enrolled before 2008 but whose ejidos did not renew the PSA-H contract. In 2013, these polygons had all been enrolled for only five years and, since the end of the payments, remained unprotected for two to five years. The tpsaalw ij variable corresponds to the time spent in the program by polygons enrolled before 2008 and whose contract had been renewed. In 2013, these polygons had been enrolled in the program for at least six years. The tpsalate variable corresponds to the time spent in the program by polygons enrolled after 2008. In 2012, these polygons had not yet completed their first five-year contract.
We estimate the following equation:
[5]
Our period of analysis is between 2005 and 2012. Nevertheless, we were able to observe contract renewal in 2013. Therefore, we chose 2008 as a threshold since the contracts entered into before 2008 had come to an end at least two years before 2013. This left enough time for the ejido to enroll the land again. Therefore, β 1 captures the effect of the PSA-H on polygons that did not reenroll either because the ejidos did not wish to or because their application had been rejected by CONAFOR. The hypothesis we test by estimating equation [5] is that the additionality of the contracts that were not renewed is lower than for other contracts or even null. Appendix Table  A3 presents statistics for the deforestation rates of each cohort (before matching). As expected, the deforestation rates for the nonenrolled forests are higher than for the enrolled forests, but this result is partially due to the selection bias. Moreover, deforestation rates are five times higher for the polygons of forests that are no longer in the program than for other beneficiary polygons. This difference is statistically significantly different from zero, while there is no statistically significant difference between the deforestation rates of the polygons that were renewed and those that were enrolled in the program after 2008. Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of propensity scores. Column (1) includes only ejido-level variables while column (2) also includes control variables at the polygon level, as presented in equation [1] . We note that the introduction of polygon-level control variables, column (2), leads the pseudo-R 2 to climb by 42% (from 0.085 to 0.12). Note that the PSA-H polygons tend to be located farther from agricultural fields and pastures and in ejidos with lower population density and deforestation risk. In the literature, these variables tend to be correlated with higher deforestation rates (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001) , which confirms the difficulty of targeting the most-endangered forests. Table 1 allows us to compute propensity scores. We restrict our sample to the common support and to the first nearest neighbors with a tolerance limit of 0.1% of difference in propensity scores between treated observations and the matches. We drop 3,021 observations, or about 30% of the sample. Among these 3,021 observations, 98% are dropped from the control group, which corresponds to 55% of the nontreated polygons. Our final sample is composed of 7,331 observations. The distribution of propensity scores for PSA-H beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries once restricted to this subsample is presented in Figure 6 . We note that both distributions are highly skewed and that overlapping areas are reasonably large.
VI. MAIN RESULTS

Propensity Scores
Estimation (2) in
Note that after the prematching, all 62 ejidos are still in our sample. On average, 25% of each ejido has been dropped. Regarding the control group, on average 55% of the nontreated polygons have been dropped from our sample in each ejido. This percentage is homogeneous among all the ejidos, with minor exceptions for smaller ejidos. Table 2 presents the results regarding additionality estimated using OLS. Column (1) FIGURE 6 Common Support presents the results using a dummy variable (equation [2] ). Column (2) introduces the time spent in the program (equation [4] ). Both variables display a negative and significant effect on deforestation. A five-year contract generates an average additionality of 1.7%, which corresponds to 0.425 ha for a polygon of 25 ha. Note that higher propensity scores are also associated with lower deforestation risk, which confirms mistargeting and the necessity to account for the selection bias in our results. Regarding control variables, one should be cautious in interpreting the estimates. For many of them, including Distance to agri or Deforestation risk, their impact is captured by the propensity scores. Introducing them allows us to correct only for remaining imbalances between the control and the treated group after controlling for propensity scores.
Additionality
Columns (3) and (4) introduce the two variables that capture leakages. The variable wtpsa1, which captures leakages within the ejidos, has a significant effect and in the expected direction. These results tend to show that if the program effectively decreases pressure in enrolled parcels, this pressure is displaced to other areas of the ejido. However, the coefficient associated with variable wtpsa2, which captures leakages in surrounding ejidos, is not significant. This is consistent with the fact that leakages are unlikely to arise in surrounding ejidos, as explained in Section V. 13 Nevertheless, it is not possible to directly 13 An important debate in the literature is the one between Wu and Roberts and Bucholtz (Wu 2000; Roberts and interpret the difference of magnitude between the two coefficients. The variable that captures leakages within the ejido is the average protection of 1 ha in the ejido and does not depend only on the number of hectares protected but also on the total stock of forest. Moreover, looking at the issue of heterogeneity allows us to better explain the results presented in Table 2 .
A potential concern with the interpretation of our results is related to the argument made by Angelsen (1995) . He wonders if the clearing of secondary vegetation should be considered deforestation. He argues that if some of an area is managed under a shifting cultivation agricultural system, clearing secondary vegetation should not be considered deforestation. Only when a system penetrates untouched forest can we regard it as deforestation. This might especially be a concern in our case since the milpa system is used in the region (an agricultural system where areas are cultivated for a few years, then left fallow for some years, before being cultivated again after slashing and burning the area). However, slash-and-burn tends to have been abandoned in the area. Moreover, according to our remote sensing analysis, less than 15% of the forest that was cleared between 2005 and 2012 has been transformed into small fields of slashand-burn agriculture. On the contrary, around 85% has been cleared to establish mechanized sedentary agricultural fields or pasture. Therefore, we are confident that our results mainly capture permanent forest clearing. Bucholtz 2005 Bucholtz , 2006 Wu 2005 ) about the existence of leakages in the context of the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program. The authors argue that the main mechanism driving the conversion of lands to agriculture is the increase in agricultural product prices due to the increase of protected lands in the first place. Here, that mechanism is not at play, as explained in Section V. The Mexican context is different from the U.S. context. First we can expect that the information on land productivity is not as available in Mexico as in the United States, and the Mexican credit market is more constrained. Thus, it is plausible that an ejido decides to protect one parcel and increase agricultural activity on another. Ejidos are informed about this program by existing institutions (such as CONAFOR) and can decide to protect some parcels, but protection never covers the entire forest endowment of the ejido. Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation [5] . In this model, we differentiate between polygons that were in the program only in the early years and were not renewed (tpsaearl), those that entered only at the end of the period (tpsalate), and those that were in the program continuously (tpsaalw) between 2005 and 2012. After the prematching, our sample included 15,305 ha that were not renewed, 21,314 ha that were renewed, and 30,057 ha that were enrolled only after 2008. Section V provides more details about how the different variables are computed.
Heterogeneity over Time
Looking at Table 3 , we note that the coefficient associated with the nonrenewed contracts (tpsaearl) is not significant. One possible explanation for this result is that these forests were not threatened in the first place. As a consequence, deforestation in the absence of the program would have been zero, which would explain the nonsignificance of the coefficient associated with the nonrenewed contracts variable (tpsaearl). 14 Appendix Table A3 rules out this explanation. De- (2015) suggests that both scenarios (rejection and nonapplication) exist; unfortunately, we do not possess the data to discriminate between them. This would, however, constitute an interesting and important area for future research. 16 Moreover, we note that once this heterogeneity is taken into account, the magnitude of the impact for the variables that capture the time spent in the program by newly enrolled grids (tpsalate) and renewed grids (tpsaalw) is very similar and the coefficients are larger than the figures shown in Table 2 . Note that these results provide empirical backing for an acknowledged concern about PES program impact: the potential lack of permanence.
Furthermore, based on Table 3 's coefficients, we did a back-of-the-envelope estimation. With a 95% confidence interval, the avoided deforestation between 2005 and 2012 in protected parcels is between 1,023 and 2,751 ha.
Proportionally to the numbers of hectares enrolled, this corresponds to an additionality between 1.3% and 3.5% (recall that in the regression sample 77,390 ha were enrolled in the program for at least one year between 15 The recent literature on crowding effects (Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 2015) emphasizes that PES could decrease intrinsic motivations to conserve, leading to more deforestation once payments have stopped. In such a case, it becomes very difficult to predict credible threats of deforestation. Beyond the monitoring capacity of CONA-FOR, this could explain why deforestation is higher in rejected polygons. 16 We requested the data to investigate on that point. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain these data and identify rejected parcels.
2005 and 2012). However, we estimate that leakage effects within the ejidos would vary between 218 ha and 2,912 ha. This estimation tends to show that most of the avoided deforestation in an ejido has been displaced to other areas of the ejido. In the most optimistic scenario involving the maximum of avoided deforestation and the minimum leakages, the additionality of the PSA-H corresponds to approximately 3% of the areas enrolled. In the worst-case scenario, deforestation is increased by the program, suggesting not only displacement of deforestation but potentially a relaxation of the credit constraint.
VII. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We run several robustness tests using alternative estimators, sample selection, and model specification. Regression tables are displayed in the Appendix.
Propensity Score Weighting
Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao (1995) propose using propensity score weighting in order to estimate program impact. propensity score weighting allows us to balance covariates between treated and nontreated observations, which may be important if treated and untreated observations have very different covariate distributions. This method is implemented as follows (Hirano and Imbens 2001; Lunceford and Davidian 2004; Austin 2011): 1. Estimate propensity scores using a probit or a logit model 2. Generate sample weights using predicted propensity scores 3. Estimate the model using weighted least squares (WLS)
Based on the estimation of the propensity score presented in Table 1 , additionality of the program is estimated using WLS. Thus we reproduce the results presented in Table 2 and 3 with sample weights equal to
[6]
Results presented in Appendix Table A4 are almost identical to those presented in Section VI.
Prematching Using Covariate Matching
We used propensity score matching in our analysis in order to select a control group and account for selection bias. An alternative to this approach is to use covariate matching, which is based not on propensity scores but on Mahalanobis vectorial distance. It is crucial to control for the propensity scores in the estimations, so, for the purpose of consistency, we have chosen propensity score matching to select our sample. However, propensity score methods might prove biased if treated and untreated observations have very different covariate distributions. Thus, we provide the results using covariate matching as a robustness test.
Results are presented in Appendix Table  A5 . The estimates are not significantly different from those obtained with propensity score matching.
Withdrawal of the Largest Ejido
As shown in Figure 2 , there is one ejido located in the northwest of Cono Sur that is much larger than the others. This ejido represents approximately 10% of our area of study. In order to ensure that this ejido alone is not driving our results, we run a robustness test excluding this ejido. The results of this estimation are presented in Appendix Table  A6 and confirm our results.
Introduction of Ejido Individual Dummies
While we introduced several control variables at the ejido level, some ejido characteristics that affect entry into the program and deforestation may remain. A solution to this issue is to introduce individual dummies at the ejido level. With ejido dummies, we cannot estimate the magnitude of leakages. Nevertheless, we can check for the robustness of our results on additionality and heterogeneity of the program over time. Results, presented in Appendix Table A7 , are once again very close to those presented in Section VI.
Selection and Estimation of Leakages
The prematching allows us to take the selection process into account in the estimation. In Section VI we showed that the polygons under protection were less threatened than those not under protection. Therefore, the prematching process dropped more-threatened forest areas in our sample, which could bias our estimations of leakages. Indeed, leakages may be lower in the regression sample than in the entire sample.
To check for the existence of such bias, we run our main models without sample selection and propensity scores. The results of this naive estimation are presented in columns (1) to (4) in Appendix Table A8 . As suspected, the coefficients associated to the leakages within the ejido (wtpsa1) are still significantly different from zero, but larger than those displayed in Table 2 .
Note that the coefficients associated with the treatment variables are also slightly higher than those found in Table 2 . This modest discrepancy with the main results is not particularly surprising considering the fact that about a third of the polygons were enrolled in the PSA-H. Note that the prematching would have had a more substantial impact if the proportion of treated polygons had been lower.
Columns (5) and (6) present an estimation without any control variables. The result of this estimation clearly shows that without any control on observable covariates, the impact of the program would have been highly overestimated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We attempt to assess the impact of a PES program over several cohorts. We estimate additionality, leakages, and permanence of the program. Our approach explicitly considers land tenure in the unit of observation but also allows us to take into account heterogeneity of protection status within forest parcels owned by the same landowner. Moreover, we simultaneously estimate direct impact and leakages with the introduction of spatially lagged exogenous variables. We also introduce heterogeneity of exposure to the treatment as we consider the time spent in the program and contract renewal. Our econometric model is estimated on a sample of beneficiaries and applicants, and we use matching to preprocess the data.
We apply this methodology in the context of the Mexican PSA-H in the Cono Sur of Yucatan State. Our results suggest a strong mistargeting issue of PSA-H allocation within the ejidos. Indeed, all else equal, after controlling for PSA-H reception, the probability of receiving PSA-H payments is inversely correlated with actual deforestation. Overall, we find that deforestation is reduced by 2.45% on enrolled parcels. We also find evidence of leakage effects. In our study area, most of the deforestation has been displaced to other areas within the ejidos. We do not find evidence of leakage effects in the neighboring ejidos. However, considering that most of the deforestation has been displaced to other areas within ejidos, there is no reason to believe that the supply of agricultural products decreased. Therefore, leakages in neighboring ejidos were very unlikely to occur. Part of our results may be attributed to shifting cultivation under the milpa system (about 15% of total deforestation), but most deforestation is linked to clearing of old-growth forests (about 85% of total deforestation).
Moreover, looking at impact heterogeneity, we find no additionality in the areas where the ejidatarios did not renew their contracts after five years. One possible explanation is that the ejidatarios withdrew lands from the program in order to clear them. Our study provides empirical backing for two acknowledged concerns about PES impact: existence of deforestation leakages and the potential lack of permanence of the impact. We are confident in our results, which withstood all of the robustness checks inflicted.
The implications of our study are twofold. First, for future impact evaluations, we provide empirical backing for the claim that care should be taken in monitoring the indirect effects of a program over space and time. Leakage effects may undermine or even offset the additionality of a program. From a policy perspective, it should be noted that monitoring leakages and postprogram clearing will not prevent these effects. PES schemes are based on voluntary enrollment, and conservation cannot be enforced on all forest parcels over time without the beneficiary's agreement. Moreover, clearing of protected lands after the end of a program is a real possibility. Therefore, evaluating the impact of a program on protected land and solely during the time an area is under conservation may lead to strongly overestimating the program's impact. Most impact evaluations have focused on additionality, while the real challenge for PES schemes may be permanence.
Second, from a policy perspective, the external validity of the results is an important matter of concern. The forests in the Cono Sur of Yucatan are predominantly held in common, as is the case in the rest of the country (about 80% of forests, 17 according to White and Martin [2002] ). Whether common property enhances or prevents leakages is an open question. According to Alix-Garcia (2007) , a large group size (i.e., a large number of ejidatarios) might make cooperation more difficult and discourage ejidos from putting lands under protection. However, it might also make it more difficult to collude and switch deforestation from one place to another. In addition, it should be remembered that our study focuses on a relatively marginal area. At this step of the development process, a forest transition is not likely to take place (Mather 1992; Wolfersberger, Delacote, and Garcia 2015) , which makes the permanence problem a greater concern than in more developed areas. Nevertheless, leakages and permanence are mainly attributable to the design of the scheme and are not specific to the Mexican context. Similar results are likely to be found in many areas around the globe where conservation programs cover only part of the forest held by groups of people or private agents. As emphasized by Pirard, Billé, and Sembrés (2010) and Karsenty (2011) , if payments do not allow investment in alternative activities that relax dependence on the forest cover, in many contexts there is no reason to believe that the impact of PES schemes will be permanent.
To conclude, although the existence of leakages is unquestionable, at least two policy options remain for policy makers. First, the evidence of leakages does not imply an absence of impact of the program on treated parcels. Even if the overall level of deforestation is not affected by program implementation, parcels covered by a program suffer from less deforestation than those not covered (additionality). Thus, targeting parcels with high ecological value may help to achieve conservation goals. Second, providing alternative livelihood options and sustainable use of the forest cover through agroforestry or sustainable forestry may be a viable alternative to ensure both permanence and minimum leakages (Aukland, Moura Costa, and Brown 2003) . However, as highlighted by Karsenty (2011) , this would require combining the incentives of PES with investment in order to relax dependence on forest clearing. 
APPENDIX
